

# Power and Inequality: Social Dimensions of Thailand's Renewable Energy Transition

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## ABSTRACT

Thailand's climate action policy, the Alternative Energy Development Plan (AEDP2018), aims to reduce Thailand's carbon footprint, transitioning from traditional fossil fuels to renewable energy sources and vitalizing economic growth sustainably (Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency, 2018). The plan was announced in 2018 in tandem with Thailand's broader National Strategy 2018-2037 (Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, 2018). As Thailand's foremost environmental action initiative, it is vital that these goals are realized in order to mitigate the effects of environmental degradation on Thailand, which ranks 9th in countries most affected by climate change (Zou & Utaipattanakul, 2025). What is the state of Thailand's rural, renewable energy transition, then, if little to no progress is being made to switch to renewables? Drawing on case studies of local participation and, most prominently, of a rural community's energy struggle (a community called Pa Deng) I argue that Thailand's renewable energy framework struggles to address the realities of renewable energy transition because of a disregard of the political nature of participation and rural needs. To make this argument, I employ an analytical framework inspired by Ferguson (1994) and Li's (2007) notion of depoliticisation to examine how renewable energy policies frame environmental challenges in technical rather than political ways. Drawing on Pa Deng and other cases, the paper examines how local investigations reveal limitations in the implementation of national policies like the AEDP2018. The analysis suggests that Thailand's renewable energy transition is framed as a technical problem, revealing a blind spot in Thailand's policy approach specifically concerning rural communities.

## INTRODUCTION

As the world faces the ever-growing issue of climate change, nations band together to create international treaties and pledge domestic net-zero goals in order to champion their fight against climate change. And yet, most countries are not on track to net-zero carbon emissions. Thailand, for instance, is still emitting more greenhouse gas (GHG) than ever despite its decrease in population growth (Zou & Utaipattanakul, 2025). Thailand is also ranked 9th in the list of countries most affected by climate change. Why is this

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still the case in the age of global warming? Thailand is a socially, culturally and politically complex country. A paternalistic culture similar to that of China has developed in Thailand. But in Thailand, sustainability initiatives, namely the Alternative Energy Development Plan (AEDP2018), show signs of stagnating renewable infrastructure adoption and in some cases increased GHG emissions. This, according to Zou and Utaipattanakul, can be attributed to a lack of transparency and mismanagement within the Thai government and state owned oil enterprises. Additionally, local case studies show that socioeconomic and geographical standings of Thais are not being weighed in the decision-making process. So from these case studies, what is revealed about the shortfalls in Thailand's AEDP2018 in rural communities?

This paper will cover Thailand's renewable energy transition by narrowing down from broader topics. Firstly, it will contextualize Thai society and what parties, from the monarchy to the Thai military to government officials, make decisions in Thai policy. Then, Thailand's state-owned oil company and how conflicts of interest arise from it will be discussed. The local, third-level administrative subdivision of governmental units in Thailand, called tambons, and from it a study of Thai collectivism and lack of equitable public participation will be considered. Lastly, this paper will conclude by tying all these ideas of Thailand's top-down government together in the final section on public participation in the development of policies by Thailand's rural population in the case study of Pa Deng. This will help strengthen this paper's goal of further understanding Thailand's current state of policy creation which has overlooked key social determinants that are woven into the environment and sustainability.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1 Centralization of governance**

Thailand, like its East Asian neighbor China, has a paternalistic society where elders act as heads of government, their respective families and so on. Thailand has had a long history with ideals of respecting and looking up to the elderly. But rather than solely concentrating on familial aspects of society, however, Thai society has a large focus on the monarchy. The monarchy is heavily revered, effectively being at the top of the social hierarchy, and Thai laws forbid criticism of the king. Beyond this we see power distribution grounded on an age-based structure for Thai public servants, starting with the Thai military. The Thai military is extremely powerful; As an armed force that can protect the monarchy, the military has a strong symbiotic relationship with the royal family, allowing the military to hold a great deal of power. This allows the monarchy and military to have significant leverage in the policymaking and decision-making process, letting them determine the beneficiaries and casualties of policies and leading to a "khakistocracy" (Chambers, 2021). Even in the less powerful Thai governmental branch, it commands, to a great extent, control within the country, upholding paralleled systems of ageist belief. As a consequence of this, scholars have argued that the Thai government still functions with a top-down government where few powerful institutions, the monarchy and top government and military officials, create centralized policies that are consolidated into a broad plan for the entire nation. Analyzing this will

play an important role in understanding the insufficient participation and even total lack of support from governmental agencies in rural areas.

## **2.2 Thai environmental action policy implementation problems**

The AEDP2018 was established in 2018 under Thailand's broader economic vision dubbed the National Strategy 2018-2037 which serves as an umbrella design for other projects. It is Thailand's environmental initiative aimed at increasing the share of renewable energy to 30% by 2037 (Zou, Utaipattanakul, 2025). Also, it is integrated with the Power Development Plan (PDP 2018), which seeks to increase the country's power generation capacity in order to manage the energy demands of the country and serves as an umbrella project itself for other environmental initiatives. The plan lists out specific sector targets from solar energy, biomass energy and wind energy which will be expanded in order to cut carbon emissions.

To that end, the Thai state-owned oil company PTT Public Company Limited (PTT) invests in government projects under the AEDP2018, including but not limited to carbon capture, green hydrogen and biofuels. Although not the main contributor to the AEDP2018, PTT holds significant influence over environmental action policies introduced by the AEDP2018 due to its status as a state-owned energy monopoly and conflict of interests problems as argued by Zou and Utaipattanakul. They argue that Thailand's renewable energy transition is being slowed by conflict of interest concerns regarding Thailand's Ministry of Energy and PTT. People with positions in the Ministry of Energy also have positions in PTT, and data collection is being sourced by oil companies instead of by the Ministry itself. This strong link between both organizations creates a situation where an effective renewable energy transition cannot be facilitated (Zou, Utaipattanakul, 2025). Due to powerful actors in charge of influential institutions, given control from Thai paternalistic ways of management, an inefficient kakistocratic policymaking process leads to worse outcomes for the people of Thailand (Chambers, 2021), especially rural dwellers who get little recognition from the central government (Buchenrieder et al., 2017).

Zou and Utaipattanakul (2025) also argue that along with the problems of elite capture of Thailand's state-owned oil company's involvement, political instability and incompetence while drawing policy decisions create a Thailand of the following properties: underdeveloped energy infrastructure and support, insufficient and inconsistent energy policies, weak existing energy and environment laws, little incentive for renewable energy transition and technological barriers to energy transition. These factors further add more strain to Thailand's environmental crisis as emissions climb sharply (Zou, Utaipattanakul, 2025). Additionally, in another paper on sustainable environmental development and community forestry, Chaiya underscores the finding that renewable energy consumption negatively impacts community forests due to land use competition and policy misalignment. Chaiya emphasizes the socioeconomic status of people reliant on community forests, and how policies may negatively affect lower income populations that still depend on forests to survive (Chaiya, 2024). This finding reveals Thailand's centralized framing of environmental problems, "rendering technical" the not so technical issue of renewables, land management and lower income communities that populate Thailand's forests.

## **2.3 Thai public policy participation in rural areas**

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Tambons are Thailand's second-level administrative subdivision within an area and their offices provide spaces for community development meetings where rural people's needs can be learned and discussed. Buchenrieder et al. (2017), though, argue that there are times when community needs are not met. They argue that this can be caused by paternalistic cultural aspects that call for submissiveness and reluctance in questioning village elites, as villagers assume that they know best, which leads to the true demands of farmers and other rural dwellers not being met. The authors also highlight communities' collectivism and their tendency to avoid conflict, by having larger group meetings, open acclamations (raising hands) and choosing projects focused on public goods that benefit the entire community. An example of the extent to which rural villagers avoid conflict is that when village leaders argue too much, villagers stop attending community development meetings. The paper also states that when village leaders interfered strongly in the planning process, such as by deleting projects from the plan without farmers' consent, participation also sharply declined (Buchenrieder et al., 2017). These studies show how even at the local level, paternalism clashes with communities' requests to address shortfalls and demands and reveals the obstacles of the Thai governance system's neglect of Thai community culture. Additionally, the authors call attention to the improvement of participation as cultural practices gradually shift, leading to more open discussion and disapproval by the rural collective especially amongst younger generations (Buchenrieder et al., 2017).

Adding to this, Delina's paper on Pa Deng, a small, rural community in Thailand's Petchaburi province, highlights how democratic engagement can exist in a non-democratic state like Thailand. Delina investigates "energy democracy", defined as an emergent social movement where energy consumers become "prosumers" involved in decisions from production to use, and that active civic participation in energy matters. Due to the Pa Deng community's location in a national park, families living in Pa Deng lack grid connection and had to rely on expensive and unsustainable fuels like kerosene and LPG. They also relied on wood from the forest, which pollutes the environment from carbon released into the atmosphere. In order to solve this issue, the community, despite neighbors living kilometers away, adopted available, sustainable energy technologies like biogas digesters which use cow manure to generate energy. Due to this, there was less negative environmental impact from GHG emissions from kerosene, LPG and the burning of wood, freed-up time from not having to gather wood, improved lighting and monetary savings (Delina 2018).

Contrasting the research on tambons to the Pa Deng case study, we quickly see shortfalls in Thai government sanctioned projects versus the grassroots initiatives developed by the collectivism of the countryside. The Pa Deng initiatives were supported by the community members themselves, which Delina emphasizes as the adoption of renewable energy was conducted as a collective effort for community development and without government intervention. Also, despite proceeding forward on their own without help from governmental or royal actors, the community members still retrace steps to the Thai monarchy through Bhumibol Adulyadej's "sufficient economy" development idea, which underpinned the Buddhist notion that less is more. Unlike the tambons' tendency to disregard farmers' voices, the projects undertaken in Pa Deng were self-launched and granted community members substantial say on how to undertake future plans. This contributed to Pa deng gaining traction to the point where people outside the community were visiting villagers and providing solar panels, which led to even

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more renewable energy transition (Delina, 2018). The contrast between tambons and Pa Deng highlights the importance of social relations and displays a lack of support from Bangkok. Instead of helping out communities still reliant on fossil fuels and GHG emitting sources, centralized environmental action plans that are the framework for the entire nation are created and disregard pastoral communities' needs.

The literature on this topic is abundant, but there is an absence of a paper that ties all these reports together, along with prevalent, key social concepts like paternalism, into an insightful, critically analyzed composition. This paper aims to achieve that and will draw on secondary sources like Thailand's energy governance or energy grid with local case studies in order to weave together a nuanced yet extensive interpretation of current renewable energy transition in Thailand. This paper's goal of critical analysis will articulate incidents like oversights within Thailand's renewable energy governance rooted to poor proportions of public participation, and indirect casualties of the ever increasing GHG emissions which could be hastened by the policies that seek to prevent it. These events will be incorporated into this paper, which will elicit more insight from readers and evoke new perspectives and knowledge on the subject matter. This leads us to the apex, the ultimate question: what is the status of renewables in Thailand's provinces and what is being left out? This paper will address these questions, factoring in the multitude of socioeconomic or political components that are apparent or hidden.

## **ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

Drawing on James Ferguson's *The Anti-Politics Machine* and Tania Murray Li's *The Will to Improve*, Ferguson's concept of "rendering technical" highlights how development projects depoliticize structural problems, reframing them as technical issues to be solved by experts. Li's notion of the "will to improve" similarly emphasizes how state actors and planners justify interventions in the name of progress, often disregarding the social and political realities of the communities they target. The two analytical tools similarly describe how disregard for the many facets of developmental issues leads to the failure of solving such issues and even worsening them. Applying these concepts to Thailand's AEDP2018, deeper investigation of the Thai government's centralized planning, top-down governing system, inattention and even absence in addressing rural populations' needs can be performed. This analytical lens will trace how environmental policies "render technical" extremely social problems, highlighting specific community-based situations like Pa Deng, which underscores the lack of recognition and support to rural households. Or in the cases of worsening the environmental issues of Thailand, Ferguson and Li's analytical lens can be applied to the community forest study, where renewable energy consumption negatively impacted community forestry (Chaiya, 2024), caused by disregarding obstacles of land competition associated with community forests. This framework will provide us with the necessary tools for studying what really is the result of Thailand's sustainable development goals, who truly benefits and who is left out or loses.

## **CASE SELECTION AND METHODS**

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I will approach the question with a case study on Thailand's renewable energy transition goals, specifically Thailand's leading energy transition policy, the AEDP2018. As authorities classify global warming as an ever-growing security issue, or, in actuality, a justice issue, particularly in an agrarian based, coastal country like Thailand, the Thai government has disclosed their plan to tackle the worldwide environmental cause with ambitious targets for the future of Thai renewable energy. The AEDP2018, for example, reveals Thailand's energy transition ambitions for the next few decades, highlighting specific renewable energy adoption arrangements for a variety of sectors. Yet, available statistics indicate more environmental degradation and a worsening of GHG emissions. By using a case study method, this paper can progress within the boundaries of, for example, rural actors and specific Thai corporations, identifying key findings accessible in the many commonalities and patterns of a case study approach.

The AEDP2018 is a suitable case study for approaching the research question because it outlines desired goals for Thailand's renewable energy adoption which, as we will soon see, is not quite accomplished in the selected articles. Created under the National Strategy 2018-2037 and being the national framework for renewable energy transition, the AEDP2018 provides an important view of the dynamics of centralized policy planning. Additionally, the AEDP2018 faces conflict of interest problems and integrated mechanisms of the AEDP2018 like the Voluntary Emission Reduction Program (T-VER) further highlight the framing of environmental issues in other contexts (T-VER played a role in Chaiya's (2024) paper on community forestry). In using this case as our basis for Thai environmental policy and integrating different case studies, the state of Thai energy transition can be analyzed.

The local case studies will be heavily utilized in this paper to add more depth. This will juxtapose the broad, national policies with local grassroots initiatives and governance, zooming into actual, local impacts and offering insight into the political ecology of Thailand's environmental policies. For instance, the report on tambon's will provide us with a better understanding of citizen participation and rural Thai culture. Tackling the question in a case study style allows for an in-depth exploration of complex social, cultural, and political dynamics that would not be captured through broader analysis on Thailand's environmental goals. By concentrating on the specific case of Thailand's renewable energy transition and taking into account other factors that influence Thai environmental policies, this paper will identify connections, patterns and other elements that will address the research question and the synthesis of all these pieces of information will contribute to the existing, scholarly literature on renewable energy transitions.

## **ANALYSIS**

### **5.1 Thailand's unbalanced system of governance**

Thailand's political system is controlled by a small set of actors. This, Chambers argues, makes Thailand a khakistocracy. He asserts that the military and monarchy exert disproportionate control over policymaking (Chambers, 2021). While this perspective captures the undeniable influence of well-established institutions, it risks obscuring the roles of civilian actors that hold considerable power

and paramount to this paper, the powerful statespersons who work at the Ministry of Energy and at PTT—in other words, designers of the AEDP2018.

Our case study, the AEDP2018, was established under Prayut Chan-o-cha's government. On a related note, Prayut Cha-o-cha was the general of the Thai army, and came to power after a coup d'état in 2014. The recurrence of coup d'états in Thailand must be underscored, as military officials hold significant authority in Thai politics, to the point where coups become a natural phenomenon and future coup d'états are to be expected (Chambers, 2021). Under Chan-o-cha's AEDP2018, a national framework for renewable energy transition was drawn. This plan, however, is highly centralized and depoliticizes/desocializes the issues surrounding renewable energy transition. By entitling non-civilian, unelected officials to outline climate action policies, social aspects concerning environmental issues are often overlooked.

For instance, renewable energy consumption has been observed to have negative impacts on community forestry. Land that would otherwise be used for community forests were being used to create solar and wind farms, leading to land competition and reduced forest areas (Chaiya, 2024). Despite this, T-VER, a program which encourages renewable energy consumption, is still being utilized alongside other policies to push Thailand's renewable energy transition goals, rather than address the underlying problems of land use in forests: lower-income groups and the forests, land competition and decreased forest cover. On the topic of low income groups, lower income groups are heavily reliant on forest areas for subsistence; Chaiya's study notes that as the income of the lowest 20% increases, community forests tend to decrease. This implies that economic development for these groups, without inclusive and sustainable alternatives, can inadvertently lead to deforestation (Chaiya, 2024). The AEDP2018 states that they will strive to alleviate poverty by creating economic opportunities for lower income groups through renewable energy infrastructure development like waste-to-energy, but the discussion in the upcoming section on rural participation will suggest answers contrary to this statement, and these commitments do not specify how they will carry out said sustainable development. Rather, they promise sustainable goals through developments in infrastructure, shifting their focus away from rural, lower income groups' needs for an alternative to forestry reliance and desocializing the problem of renewable energy infrastructure development on the livelihoods of rural populations.

Leaving policymaking to a few influential governmental officials can be equally as ineffective at achieving Thailand's environmental action goals. The Ministry of Energy, which heads the AEDP2018, relies on oil companies for data, and has a multitude of transparency and conflict of interest problems. There are Ministry of Energy officials that serve as officials at PTT at the same time, slowing down progress on environmental policies; Weak environmental regulations contribute to pollution and oil spills, with financial burdens often shifted to the public rather than responsible companies, raising concerns of corruption between regulators and energy businesses; PTT serves as a monopoly over petroleum, shutting down any competition, innovation or responsiveness to environmental problems. The military's presence in the energy sector is also increasing, further complicating energy decision-making and transparency, with instances of manipulation of legislation to benefit specific companies (Zou, Utaipattanakul, 2025). To understand what mechanisms allowed this to happen, looking back at this paper's analytical framework inspired by Li's "rendering technical" and Ferguson's "depoliticization" would be beneficial.

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Both studies' similarities to this case study are apparent. First and foremost, Ferguson's concept of depoliticization is observable in the methods and goals outlined by the AEDP2018. The project frames renewable energy transition as a technical challenge of energy percentages and efficiency targets. The description provided of environmental and developmental problems convey a sense of neutrality, as if the problems defined are unrelated to social standings or lack of public participation. And despite failure to promote renewable energy without harming local environments, the government is still able to extend bureaucratic power through centralization of data and establishment of new departments and committees created for the purpose of renewable energy transition. For instance, The Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP) implemented the Department Operation Center (DOC) which was specifically designed to centralize data management and enhance policy decision-making, expanding the Thai government's bureaucratic apparatus.

From the perspective of Li (2007), military, government and PTT elites express a "drive" to better develop sustainable infrastructure for low income populations, while advancing Thailand's renewable energy transition goals. These projects suggest that decisions are made based on Bangkok's vision of progress. Thailand aims to address emissions from concrete using carbon capture and storage, even though it isn't considered a major, viable climate solution yet. The AEDP2018 outlines plans for electric vehicle (EV) adoption despite a lack of EV infrastructure (Zou, Utaipattanakul, 2025). And the government pushes for renewable energy adoption but ignores how such a policy could shift land use away from community forests (Chaiya, 2024). Although having just these examples on centralized decision-making does not nationally represent the state of Thailand's renewable energy transition, it serves as context to Thailand's state of governance and a critical lens that exposes certain realities of current governance and policymaking that neglect community needs and force their ideals onto whole populations.

## **5.2 Rural participation**

Thailand's current political system lacks public participation, especially from rural areas. Centuries of paternalism have shaped Thai society to adopt ideals of looking up to the elderly, which are assumed in Thai politics and governance as well. Even in the increasingly young, democratic capital, Thailand's traditional culture that venerates age is ever-present. It's because of this social factor that local initiatives are instructed by unpopular village leaders and have allowed the successors of influential parties to create centralized national strategies that causes farmer involvement to wane, and wards off authentic feedback and propositions.

The study on tambons by Buchenrieder et al. reveal the power dynamics at the local level of Thai rural society. There is a strong emphasis on the collective and upholding collectivist values of maintaining harmony (avoiding conflict or criticism) and agreeing upon a collective initiative, such as a public good, that benefits everyone in the community. A community consensus, however, indicates that few of the farmers surveyed truly aligned with prominent village members' ideas. Over 60% of farmers claimed to vote for projects benefiting all farmers, while only 10% followed the majority vote and 2% followed village leaders' ideas directly. Moreover, when village leaders intervened in planning processes and when village leaders argued with one another, tambon participation sharply declined (Buchenrieder et al., 2017).  
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Such examinations of rural participation in decisionmaking indicate an inhibition of expressing genuine farmer demands, established by paternalistic practices which leave influence in the hands of a few village elites rather than with the community itself. This also highlights how true public participation cannot be accomplished without accommodating rural populations with systems that allow for cordial displays of criticism.

Returning to my previous mention of AEDP2018's poverty alleviation policies, Thailand's developmental approach to aiding lower income populations by providing them with renewable energy sources is an unsuccessful framework that neglects geographic and social inequalities among rural dwellers. This is demonstrated in a case study on Pa Deng. Lacking grid connection, Pa Deng community members were constrained to expensive, unsustainable and GHG emitting sources like kerosene and wood (Delina, 2018). The Pa Deng residents did not receive any help—especially in waste-to-energy installations that the AEDP2018 committed to providing—from any governmental, military or royal institutions, providing evidence to support my previously introduced point. Also, this highlights the disregard of social problems as Bangkok's solution to sustainable forestry conservation here was to ignore communities living within them and keep energy access away from these communities. The Pa Deng community, however, did not cease its pursuit of cheaper, more available renewable energy sources. Instead, through a collective effort by community members (who live kilometers apart), households were able to adopt renewable energy systems like biogas digesters, which decreased GHG emissions and freed up time for villagers to do other things rather than gathering wood. Furthermore, despite independently creating better opportunities for themselves, Pa Deng residents still call attention to King Rama 9's "sufficient economy" framework as a key role in Pa Deng's renewable energy transition (Delina, 2018). An important takeaway is how productivity increased as a result of this independent renewable energy transition. Villagers knew what their problems were, and through a collectivist mindset sought out to resolve such problems, actually benefiting the Thai economy by enhancing output capabilities. Moreover, Villagers' statements of King Rama 9's economic concept further underlines the omnipresent influence of the Thai monarchy, and how despite not receiving any support from external actors, the Pa Deng community were still able push their sustainability initiatives, even being visited by urban individuals and gifted solar panels (Delina, 2018). This shows how democratic energy discussion can still take place in a society where a few powerful actors shape future public policy. Grassroots models accentuate the participatory aspect of community and environmental action projects and uplifts notions of improvement even in illiberally governed states.

Depoliticization, as spotlighted throughout this paper, is observed to obstruct the Thai people's true needs, and that centralized planning masks Thailand's real problems. Thailand's agricultural sector faces many environmental hurdles, including but not limited to pesticides and crop burning, which further emphasize the necessity of an across-the-board plan to develop Thailand's renewable energy infrastructure. But foremost, with Thailand being one of the largest agricultural exporters in the world and employing millions of Thais, farmers' voices are key to creating a comprehensive, all-embracing strategy that can sustainably develop the nation. The tambon study highlights how even at the local level, hierarchies of influence create conflicts and policies ineffective to truly addressing sustainable development issues. On the contrary, the Pa Deng case study shows how effective projects can be executed by contributors (Pa Deng households) themselves. Contrasting Tania Murray Li's *The Will to Improve*—which stresses how institutions disregard local realities in favor of nonviable visions of progress—and the Pa Deng case study

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effectively shows how feasible change can occur from a hands-on position. By familiarizing with the problem, which Pa Deng community members know too well, and having substantial control on decisions and a physical presence in locations where the problems are most prevalent, a successful plan that recognizes shortfalls within communities' infrastructure and social/geographic standing can be laid out. The Thai government's plan to leave national parks as is, believing that doing so would conserve the natural environment, speaks to the shortcomings of Thailand's renewable energy policy, which has demonstrated to depoliticize the conditions and affairs of rural dwellers.

## CONCLUSION

The outlined case studies on Thailand's renewable energy and governance systems touch on disciplines ranging from political ecology, developmental studies and energy transitions. The blend of numerous sources and topics makes for a well-articulated synopsis of Thailand's energy transition and state of governance but there are limitations. This paper relies on secondary sources which risks possible misinterpretations and limits the ability to capture the full extent of local Thai governance. But aside from this, the case studies mentioned relating to Thailand's energy transition plans are suitable considerations of Thailand's AEDP2018 measures that reflect a disengaged, almost autocratic energy transition where a centralized government discounts the importance of socioeconomic standings and politics. So in addressing the many promises nations have made to make a lasting impact on their carbon footprint and environment, one thing is for certain: sustainable economic growth is difficult, and requires attentive cooperation and transparency, something rather infrequent in today's world. Despite all this, the Pa Deng study leaves us with not only a glimpse into Thailand's current energy transition shortcomings but an important insight into how a united effort for development can promote beneficial democratic practices in the face of an uncertain era of energy transition. To end with Ferguson and Li's points, the framing of any problem is extremely important. So if a successful facilitation towards renewable energy transition is truly desired, the inclusion of all groups will be very important to that goal.

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