Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: A Comparative Analysis of the Bank of England and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey

Central bank independence remains a debate in macroeconomic policymaking, particularly with regard to its impact on inflation control and broader economic stability. This paper examines how varying degrees of central bank independence influence macroeconomic performance by comparing the Bank of England and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Drawing on theoretical frameworks such as the time inconsistency problem and arguments for democratic accountability, the study evaluates both the benefits and limitations of independent monetary policy. The findings suggest that higher levels of independence are associated with improved inflation outcomes, stronger policy credibility and more stable macroeconomic conditions. On the other hand, political intervention in monetary policy is linked to reduced credibility and heightened economic volatility. However, the analysis also acknowledges the role of political coordination during periods of crisis. Overall, the paper argues that institutional independence plays a critical role in enhancing long-term macroeconomic performance.