From Common-Law Inheritance to Constitutional Supremacy: India's Post-Independence Legal Transformation
Ayaana Gaggar
26/10/2026
At the time of independence in 1947, India had not only statutes, but a legal system: a common law way of thinking, a doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, a judiciary accustomed to deferring to the legislature, and a case law system built on English precedent. The India of today, however, has a written, fixed Constitution, a robust Bill of Rights, a judiciary which can invalidate constitutional changes, and a jurisprudence of "basic structure" that bears no direct parallels to the United Kingdom. This review attempts to summarize the available scholarship on the Indian post-Independence legal transformation and suggest that this transformation must be understood as a selective constitutional rupture, rather than a complete “legal” shift, as constitutional supremacy, constitutional review of constitutional amendments, entrenched fundamental rights, and a unique federalism were far more shaken than the common law reasoning, private law, procedure, and legal professionalism were. The review focuses on four aspects of constitutional change in the literature, before addressing the continuities that qualify any rupture narrative, and suggests that the order that emerges can be characterized as a hybrid, neither British nor American, constitutional common law system. It also brings to light the under-theorization of the relationship between the Constitutional writers' constitutional decisions and the colonial legal culture. While the review is not exhaustive, it provides an extensive overview of the central scholarship in the field, not built on primary empirical studies, but rather on constitutional law scholarship, legal history and case law analysis.
