The Nature of Morality: A Philosophical Investigation of the Foundations of Ethics

In my research paper, I investigated how effective the main objectivist moral theories are against the main objections to objective morality, and if any of the main objectivist moral theories are ultimately plausible.

Throughout my paper, I evaluated a wide range of arguments and ethical frameworks, starting by explaining three objectivist moral theories: naturalist realism, non-naturalist realism, and Kantian constitutivism. I tested each theory against three challenges, including the error theory, moral skepticism, and Hume’s is-ought gap. I argued that Kantian constitutivism is the objectivist moral theory that best withstands the objections to objective morality, as this theory avoids many complications that often cause the alternative theories to fall short — for example, the theory that mind-independent moral truths exist is a central argument of both naturalist realism and non-naturalist realism that acts as an Achilles’ heel when these moral lenses are faced with their counterarguments. However, I showed that the arguments of Kantian constitutivism, such as Kant’s idea of the categorical imperative, may be vulnerable to Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of morality in particular. For instance, Nietzsche attacks Kant’s categorical imperative by applying his idea of the will to power to Kant’s moral framework, illustrating that executing certain principles of Kantian constitutivism is simply an attempt to express authority. I concluded that although Kant’s moral framework consisted of well-supported arguments, through the use of psychology, biology, and genealogy, Nietzsche’s critique significantly weakened his arguments.