A Formalization and Defense of Basic Prudential Hedonism

https://doi.org/10.65161/recXeTVXBAotUij2G

This paper aims to formalize Basic Prudential Hedonism (BPH)-which holds that an agent's prudential obligation lies in maximizing net pleasure and constructs a tailored instrumental obligation framework for ignorant, learning hedonistic agents. It first clarifies BPH's philosophical foundations (e.g., prudence-morality separation, hedonic welfare) and defends its three core theses (phenomenological, calculation, evaluative) against objections via Nelson's arguments (|Nelson, 2020, p. 15]). Then, it sketches a modification for Yan and He's (Yan and He 2025 ) causaldeontic model of instrumental obligation to include hedonic value quantification, belief weighting, probabilistic interventions, and learning mechanisms (Bayesian updates). Finally, it validates the "Ought Implies Can" principle for BPH by distinguishing prudential from moral obligations, addressing King's (King, 2014, p. 316]) challenge. This work provides both theoretical clarity for BPH and a practical tool for analyzing prudential choices.